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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT AWARDING
PERMANENT ALIMONY TO THE PETITIONER
The Respondent, Mr. Peterson states that the trial "court properly considered all

factors required by U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7) (1999 Supp.) In determining whether Petitioner
was entitled to an award of permanent alimony." The trial court did not, however,
properly consider all the required factors. Failure to consider all of the required factors is
per se an abuse of discretion. ( See Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489, 492 (Utah App. 1991),
"Failure to consider the Jones factors in fashioning an alimony award constitutes abuse of
discretion.")
Specifically, the trial court did not make a finding on Mrs. Peterson's ability to
provide for herself. It is undisputed that the court found that Mrs. Peterson had a net
income of approximately $600.00 per month (R. 125 ^27) (there is nothing in the record
which suggests that her gross monthly income was $1,000.00 as the Respondent suggests.
See Respondent's Brief p. 9). The record does indicate that her gross income for 1998
was $10,438.99. R. 150, p. 23. The record also indicates that on behalf of Mrs.
Peterson's dependent adult daughter, she receives $500.00 monthly in Supplemental
Security Income. R. 125, ^[27. The record indicates that Mrs. Peterson "generally works
not more than 25 hours per week." R. 126, TJ22. The Respondent then states that as such,
"Petitioner is available to work in addition to 25 hours per week." Appellee's Brief, p.
10. This is an assumption made by the Respondent, but is not the finding of the court.

The trial court made a finding that Mrs. Peterson's reasonable and necessary monthly
expenses were $2,415.00. R. 125,^24. The trial court, however, made no finding of Mrs.
Peterson's ability to provide for herself; to increase her total net income from $600.00 (or
$1,100.00 if her expenses also include her dependent daughter's expenses) to the
$2,415.00 necessary to maintain her present lifestyle. Thus the trial court worked around
the edges of the requirement to find what Mrs. Peterson's abilities were to support herself,
but did not make the required finding.
In divorce proceedings, the court may consider the fault of the parties when
making a determination of whether to award alimony. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(b)
(1999 Supp.). Mr. Peterson claims that the court reviewed the issue of fault and based
upon all the circumstances found that Mrs. Peterson' refusal to relocate to California was
the cause of the parties' divorce and thus Mrs. Peterson's fault. Appellee's Brief, pp. 1213. This contention is not supported by the record. The record does show, that when Mr.
Peterson decided to acquire employment in California, Mr. Peterson requested Mrs.
Peterson to accompany him to California and that Mrs. Peterson refused that request. R.
150, HT[ 38-40.
If the trial court would have visited the issue of fault, based upon the present
findings of the court, it most likely would have stated that Mr. Peterson voluntarily left
his employment at National Cinema Service in Utah and attempted to uproot the family
from Utah to California. That when Mrs. Peterson declined to move, Mr. Peterson opted
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to leave her alone in Utah to begin working in California and thus was at fault for the
parties' divorce. As stated above, the court did not, however, make a finding of fault. It
is not proper for the respondent to now try to read fault into the record. If this Court
nevertheless agrees with Mr. Peterson - that Mrs. Peterson was at fault for causing the
divorce - the Court would be espousing a doctrine that would be blatantly against public
policy. Specifically, the Court would establish a precedent that the wife is subservient to
the desires and wishes of her husband and that if the wife does not obey his wishes, then
all that results from her alleged disobedience is the fault of the wife.
In the Peterson's situation, the parties simply agreed to disagree. A long distance
marriage is difficult to maintain, but the parties chose to try. The record shows that the
parties chose to live in separate locations but still held themselves out as a married
couple. Mr. Peterson, of his own volition, sent $450.00 per week to Mrs. Peterson from
the time Mr. Peterson began working in California until about September 1998. R. 120,
^[59. The record also shows that Mr. Peterson frequently traveled from California to
Utah on many different occasions and that Mrs. Peterson would occasionally travel to
California and that while they were living in apart, they spoke to each other almost every
night on the telephone. R. at 150, pp. 13,61-63. For it then to be said that one party is at
fault for either choosing to move away or choosing not to move away is not support by
the facts in this case.
Furthermore, because the parties decided to maintain a long distance marriage does
3

not answer the question of whether the marriage was of short term. Mr. Peterson
contends that the trial court labeled the marriage "short term" based upon Mrs. Peterson's
refusal to accompany Mr. Peterson to California. Appellee's Brief, p. 12-13. The
findings of facts regarding the length of the marriage state only that "in or about August
of 1994, when respondent moved from Utah County to southern California in connection
with pursing employment, the parties' marriage was effectively terminated." R. at 122,
^46. The language of this finding does not point the finger at either party for causing the
end of the marriage, but simply states that the marriage was effectively over when Mr.
Peterson began working in California.
Mr. Peterson then argues that the trial court determined to not award alimony
because the court found, in conjunction with its other findings, that the marriage was a
short term marriage and thus no alimony should be awarded. Respondent's Brief p. 14.
A full review of the trial record reveals that the court made its determination to not award
alimony principally based upon the finding that the marriage was short term. While the
trial court undeniably has broad discretion in determining an award of alimony, the trial
court has no discretion to rule as a matter of law that their marriage was of shorter
duration than it actually lasted.

4

IL

THE PETITIONER HAS SUFFICIENTLY MARSHALED 1HE
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND
SHOWN THEM TO BE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS

The Respondent claims that the Petitioner has failed in her burden of marshaling
the facts in support of the court's findings and then demonstrating that they are erroneous.
The Utah Supreme Court has most recently stated the marshaling requirement as follows:
[T] he appealing party has the burden of marshaling the evidence in support of the
verdict and then showing that it is insufficient.
Fitz v. Synthes, 990 P.2d 391, 393 (Utah 1999). Mr. Peterson appears to want a
magnificent display of the facts supporting the court's conclusion with a then glorious
attack in finding the fatal flaw. There are only three findings of facts whicli Mi s.
Peterson argues are contrary to the evidence. It does not matter how she argues them, they
are too few to create a magnificent array of points.
Mrs. Peterson's brief points out the evidence which the court used to make its
findings regarding Mr. Peterson's income and expenses. Specifically IVIrs, Peterson's
brief states that "Mr. Peterson represented his monthly expenses to be $3,878.53 on his
financial declaration (R. at 151, Defendant's Exhibit 6), which the trial court took at face
value." Appellant's Brief, p. 23. Mrs. Peterson's brief states that the trial court accepted
Mr. Peterson's financial statement which represented his net mnnihl\ income to be
$3,449.00. See Appellant's Brief, p 21. Finally, Mrs. Peterson's brief states that there
was no evidence accepted by the trial court to support the court's finding that "Individuals
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have been laid off from [Mr. Peterson's] department at the Walt Disney Company. . ."
(R. at 120, K 58) and directed this Court to a portion of the record where this issue was
discussed at trial. See Appellant's Brief p. 20. These three findings are essentially the
only findings of fact which Mrs. Peterson claims are erroneous. Mrs. Peterson clearly set
forth in her brief the disputed findings of fact and the evidence which the trial court used
supports these findings. The evidence used by the court to support these findings of fact
constitute every shred of evidence available which would support the court's findings. As
such Mrs. Peterson has met the burden of marshaling the evidence to support the court's
findings.
Furthermore, Mr. Peterson, in his brief, recites the same evidence as Mrs. Peterson
in support of the court's contested findings of fact.
Mr. Peterson further claims that the trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous;
that the evidence can only support the trial court's findings. Appellee's Brief, p. 19. As
stated above, Mr. Peterson claimed on his financial declaration that he had a net income
of $3,499.00 which the court accepted. R. at 120, ^{63. Mr. Peterson's financial
declaration is the only piece of evidence supporting this finding. Mr. Peterson's pay
check stub was submitted into evidence which clearly showed that his gross income for
the first six months of 1999 was $45,601.46. This pay stub also indicates that Mr.
Peterson paid $17,934.19 in taxes deducted from his paycheck for the same time period.
See Appellant's Brief, Addendum C, p.43. Simple mathematics then reveals that Mr.
6

Peterson's average monthly net income was $4,611.21 for the first six months of 1999. A
payroll check stub is far more credible evidence to indicate a person's income than is
someone's simple statement of what he earns. Furthermore, Mr. Peterson's financial
declaration of his income was based upon his base wage, not upon his true average
income for the first six months of the year. See R at 150, pp 81-82.
Mr. Peterson then contends that the trial court's finding concerning Ins reasonable
and necessary expenses are supported by the evidence. Both he and Mrs. Peterson note in
their briefs that at least one expense amount on his financial statement was blatantly false.
See Appellee's Brief, p. 18; / : dlant's Brief, p. 23. The only evidence which supports
the trial court's finding that Mr. Peterson's reasonable ;mtl neeessan m< mthly expenses
are $3,278.53 is his financial statement. Mr. Peterson claims his in court admission that
the financial statement does not accurately reflect his expenses is not a "fatal flaw" in the
evidence. The difference between the two amounts, first as found by the court of
$3,878.53 and the latter, as shown by Mr. Peterson's own testing

of $3,278.53,

decreases his claimed expenses by nearly 16%. The most credible evidence of Mr.
Peterson's expenses is his financial statement but only as modified by his testimony. The
purpose of presenting evidence of Mr. Peterson's income and expenses was to determine
Mr. Peterson's ability to pay alimony. The most credible evidence reiiardiitt? i\ Ir.
Peterson's net income and his reasonable and necessary expenses do not support the
court's finding. As such, when the difference between the accepted evidence and the
7

most credible evidence is so great, it cuts at the heart of the purpose of the evidence,
creating a fatal flaw in the court's findings of facts.
The trial court also found that Mr. Peterson's ability to work overtime had
diminished. There is uncontroverted evidence that Mr. Peterson's ability to work
overtime diminished. Perhaps the trial court thought it was thus reasonable to use Mr.
Peterson's base pay rather than his historical pay. Mr. Peterson states in his brief that his
monthly average income for the first six months of 1999 was substantially less than his
average monthly income for 1997. Appellee's Brief p. 17. The documentary evidence
presented at trial, however, indicates that Mr. Peterson was still working some overtime
on a regular basis and receiving overtime pay in 1999. Furthermore, nothing in the record
indicates that Mr. Peterson would not continue to work overtime, even if it is at a
diminished rate from his overtime opportunities of 1997. Mr. Peterson erroneously states
that Mrs. Peterson is arguing that Mr. Peterson's income for the purposes of determining
alimony should be based not only on his income for the first six months in 1999 but also
on the income for 1997 and 1998. The only argument that Mrs. Peterson makes is that
Mr. Peterson's income should be based upon his actual income for the first six months of
1999 rather than his base income level.
Overtime pay is clearly used in calculating alimony obligation if it was regularly
received and used to meet the needs of the parties. Moon v. Moon. 973 P.2d 431, fn 8
(Utah App. 1999). In 1999 Mr. Peterson was required to take a one week furlough from
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his employment. R. at 121 % 58. Even missing a week's work, his actual income for
these six months far exceeds what the trial court found his income to be.
Mr. Peterson states that the court found his ability to work overtime in the future
was uncertain. Appellee's Brief p. 18. As stated above, the trial court only found that
Mr. Peterson's ability to work was diminished. R. at 121 ^f 58. Nothing indicates that he
will continue working the rest of the year at any substantial difference in pay froni the
first half of the year. One of the findings of facts which may have contributed to the court
using his financial declaration income amount is that the court erroneously found that
people had been laid off from Mr. Peterson's department at Walt Disney. R. at 121 f 58.
As Mrs. Peterson discussed in her brief (Appellant's Brief p. 20) this matter was
discussed in trial but no evidence was admitted to indicate that people were being laid off
at Disney. The record actually shows that Mr. Peterson was one of five projection
engineers in his department when he started with Walt Disney but as of the date of the
trial, there were eight projection engineers. R. at 150, p.80 and Appellant's Brief, p. 20.
Thus there is no evidence to support the trial court's finding that people were being laid
off at Walt Disney. The only evidence on the matter shows that Disney had hired more
people. Therefore, for the trial court to find Mr. Peterson's net monthly income was
3,449.00 was clearly erroneous. Furthermore, to find that Mr. Peterson's income was less
than the evidence showed based on the erroneous finding that people were being laid off
at Disney was an abuse of discretion.
9

Finally, Mr. Peterson states that none of his expenses are unreasonable or
excessive and thus were properly deemed reasonable by the court. Appellee's Brief, p.
19. These expenses are not reasonable when used to justify leaving Mrs. Peterson
impoverished when the credible evidence shows Mrs. Peterson has a net income of
$600.00 per month (or $1,100.00 when combined with the income of her dependent
daughter) and Mr. Peterson has a net income of $4,611.00. Nor are these expenses
reasonable when considering that Mr. Peterson uses this money to drive a late model
sports car and Mrs. Peterson is left with an old car that does not run well. Appellant's
Brief Addendum "D"and R. at 150 p. 28-29. The only expenses Mr. Peterson could have
that are reasonable would be those he has money left to pay after paying alimony.

CONCLUSION

The trial court abused is discretion by not making a finding as to Mrs. Peterson's
ability to support herself. The trial court further erred, as a matter of law, in finding that
the parties's marriage ended at the point the couple agreed to disagree on where to live.
Finally the trial court's findings of Mr. Peterson's income and expenses were clearly
erroneous. Mrs. Peterson marshaled all evidence available that would support the trial
court's findings and then showed that the more credible evidence warrants a different
finding. The purpose behind reviewing Mr. Peterson's income and expenses was to
10

determine his ability to pay alimony. The significant difference between the court's
findings and the credible evidence creates a fatal flaw in the court's accepted findings.
Divorce proceedings are matters of equity. When a marriage lasts for nearly ten
years and one spouse depended on the other for financial support during that entire time,
to deny the financially dependant spouse alimony support may and in this case does result
in inequity. Mrs. Peterson was financially dependant upon Mr. Peterson for nearly ten
years. Mr. Peterson has the ability to provide that support and Mrs. Peterson has a
continuing need. To allow the trial court to deny Mrs. Peterson alimony because she did
not want to move to California is unfair.
Mrs. Peterson requests this Court to remand this case for supplemental proceedings
and findings consistent with its opinion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /7*%ay of October, 2000.

^o^
David A. McPhie
Attorney for Appellant
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